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COMMENT/ Zoning-The Floating Zone:
A Potential Instrument of Versatile Zoning
".... we have unnecessarily prolonged the existence of a land use control device
conceived in another era when the true and frightening complexity of urban
life was barely appreciated. We have through heroic efforts and with massive
doses of legislative remedies, managed to preserve what was once a busty in-
fant not only past the retirement age but well into senility .... "1
LOCAL MUNICIPALITIEs derive the authority to zone a locality through
enabling legislation enacted by the state. 2 A majority3 of the state legislatures
have accomplished this delegation by adopting the wording of the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act 4 proposed by the Department of Commerce. The
act empowers the local legislative body to enact zoning ordinances dividing
the municipality into zones of varying uses and in such number, shape or
area as the legislative body deems suitable for sound community develop-
ment. In determining the suitability of an area for a specific land use the
legislative body is required by the act to look beyond the present 5 because any
ordinance enacted pursuant to the enabling act must constitute a compre-
hensive approach to a land use program.6 Mr. Yokley, in his treatise on zon-
ing aptly summarizes this rule:
I Reps, Requiem for Zoning, 1964 Pomeroy Memorial Lecture presented to A.S.P.O. Na-
tional Planning Conference in Feb.-March 1964 ZONING DIGEST.
I See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Supreme Court upheld
zoning ordinances as a valid exercise of the police powers of the state.
8 Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REv. 105 (1963).
'Reprinted in 2 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 100-01 (3d ed. 1962).
5 Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
a CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 8, ch. 124, § 8-2 1966) is typical: Such regulations shall be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan and shall be designed to lesson congestion in
the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, flood and other dangers; to promote health
and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding
of land; to avoid undue concentration of population and to facilitate the adequate
provision for transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public require-
ments. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to the character
of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses and with a view to con-
serving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout such municipality.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 40:55-32 (1964); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5226 (1956).
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A local government's legislative body, in enacting zoning ordinances, must con-
tinually bear in mind that, to be valid, a zoning regulation or ordinance must
be enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan .... 7
The purpose of the foregoing statutory prerequisite that any zoning or-
dinance be in accordance with a comprehensive plan is to avoid an arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable exercise of the broad zoning powers
granted to the community.8 Unless the ordinance attempts to benefit the pub-
lic good or the community as a whole-the objectives contemplated in the
prescribed comprehensive plan-the ordinance is invalid as outside the
power delegated by the state to the political subdivision. To protect the pub-
lic against any misuse of power the courts have developed rigid standards for
measuring the actions taken by the local legislative bodies. Hence, when the
zoning ordinance or amendment thereto is adopted by the governing body
it must supplement a master plan of community development and the pur-
pose and procedure of the enactment is subject to careful review by the
courts.
The rigidity of the act's requirement that any zoning ordinance be in ac-
cord with a comprehensive plan is, at best, inconsistent with the effective
development of a land use program. The search is on, led by city planners,
for valid means of introducing flexibility into zoning ordinances heretofore
interpreted as establishing more or less permanent districts.9 How can the
local legislative body, even with the aid and advice of a capable planning
commission, hope to so district the municipality as to anticipate and desig-
nate in advance on the zoning map all or more than a few districts in loca-
tions that meet the particular needs of certain specialized uses? Furthermore,
Professor McDougal 0 points out that a significant recent development in
zoning is the emergence of certain new concepts of "regionalism" and "or-
dered mixed uses". Against this background of new fangled uses and the con-
cept of regionalism emerges the city planner's recent device aimed at recon-
ciling the statutory requirement that any zoning ordinance constitute an ex-
tension of a pre-planned approach to land use in the municipality with the
local government's inability to forecast accurately what use constitutes the
"eternal" highest and best use of specific land. This device is the floating
zone.
The phrase floating zone, in the most general sense, might be defined as
1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 121 (3d ed. 1965).
Supra note 6.
Stickel, Report of Committee on Zoning and Planning, 25 NIMLO MUNIC. L. REv. 512,
527 (1962); see also Ellicott v. City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 181, 23 A.2d 649, 651 (1942).
10 McDougal, The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts; Rules and Institutions Relating
to Property, 4 J. PUB. L. 93, 188 (1955).
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a special permit accomplished by a zone-change amendment." In enacting
or amending its zoning regulations the local government establishes a use
classification which is not necessarily placed anywhere on the zoning map at
the time such classification is written into the text of the zoning ordinance.
The district, usually providing for a specialized use, figuratively floats above
the landscape in no fixed position, until it is brought down to earth by a
boundary-change rezoning amendment. Initially, the object of the floating
zone was to locate those selected uses, such as apartment houses, shopping
centers, and industrial parks whose location was dependent upon the un-
predictable preferences and needs of the residential community and the ever-
diminishing supply of land for the business community.12 Certainly subur-
ban apartment-house living was not anticipated by Justice Sutherland in
1926 when he delivered his classic decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Co;'8 nor could the Supreme Court at that time foresee essential defense man-
ufacturers being requested by the federal government to seek locations not
less than ten miles from possible bombing targets.' 4 Yet it was in Village of
Euclid and in two subsequent decisions' 5 in the following two years, forty
years ago, that many of the guideposts for zoning were defined. The very
purpose of creating a floating zone is to provide the flexibility necessary to
meet the requirements of new types of uses which seem to be emerging at a
progressively increasing rate.
Typically, the concept of a floating zone originates in the city planner's
recommendations to the legislative body. The establishment of the floating
zone may be by amendment to the existing zoning regulations or by incor-
poration into a new zoning plan. Usually the ordinance or amendment will
impose mininum lot requirements, set back and side yard restrictions, park-
ing and nuisance controls.' 6 More specific limitations may exist when the
floating zone allows for commercial or industrial land use. However, the leg-
islative procedure in creating the floating use does not include delineating
its boundaries on the official zoning map. The location of the zone is left for
later determination by the municipal legislative body or an administrative
"Craig, Particularized Zoning: Alterations While You Wait, 1 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING
AND ZONING 153, 173 (1961).
1 O'Harron, Why Are We Going Where, 2 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING 1, 12-13,
(1962).
Village of Euclid, supra note 2.
This requirement was raised by the petitioning industrialist in Huff v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957) when he sought to locate a light manufacturing plant
outside a metropolitan area.
"I Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608-09 (1927); Necton v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183,
188 (1928).
8 Supra note 6. The typical ordinance creating a floating zone will incorporate several
restrictions necessary to advance the general purpose of zoning depicted in the Connecticut,
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agency such as a zoning board of appeals. 17 The action may be initiated by
the legislative body in the exercise of its responsibility for benefiting the pub-
lic in general or it may be initiated by a petitioning landowner before the
zoning appeals board.
One area of dispute over the floating zone is the procedures followed in
locating the zone. When the power to locate a special use district is confer-
red upon an administrative body such as a zoning board of appeals, is there
an improper delegation of legislative authority violative of the due process
provisions of the United States Constitution? Or, if a private developer in-
stitutes the proceedings for the location of the district, has the planning
function of zoning been transferred from the government to individuals?
Another area of dispute is the statutory requirement that the zoning ordi-
nance be enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan of the affected
community. Is the floating zone "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"?
Must all zones be specifically located in the zoning ordinances to comply with
the state enabling act?'
8
It is in the wording of section 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act 19 that the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" apparently
originated.20 The implication of the phrase is explicit: vital to the validity
of any zoning regulation is its consistency with a master plan.21 Accordingly,
the validity of a floating zone will depend, inter alia, upon whether that
particular land classification of that specific property conforms to a master
plan; indeed, whether a master plan for the municipality exists.
What constitutes a judicially acceptable master plan? Discontented pro-
testants attacking zoning regulation on this issue have found that "this [mas-
ter] plan, or comprehensive plan with which the ordinance must conform,
is many things to many courts."2 2
It may be the basic zoning ordinance itself, or the generalized "policy" of the
local legislative or planning authorities in respect to their city's development-
or it may be nothing more than a general feeling of fairness and rationality. Its
identity is not fixed with any precision, and no one can point with confidence
to any particular set of factors, or any document, and say that there is the gen-
eral plan to which the zoning enabling act demands fidelity.23
Opinions demonstrate a wide range of interpretation as to the necessary
ingredients of an acceptable plan as evidenced by the Connecticut Supreme
New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania statutes.
17 Yokley, op. cit. supra note 7, at 133.
18 Both Yokley and Reno have raised these issues. See notes 6 & 3 supra.
192 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 4.
O'Harron, supra note 12.
2 Craig, supra note 11.




Court's holding in Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals. 24 In Bishop the court
held that a comprehensive plan is one which is general, and that since a city-
wide zoning ordinance is general it is, by definition, comprehensive. Such a
liberal interpretation of the statutory wording "in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan" has not, however, been followed in recent decisions where
courts have been confronted with the issue of the floating zone.
The protestants in Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown25 avoided an exten-
sion of the Connecticut court's syllogism by .arguing that any process of sin-
gling out a certain land area for a use classification totally different from uses
allowed in the surrounding area is subject to the charge of "spot zoning".
The New York court in Rodgers, while it upheld the zoning amendment
which created an apartment house zone without delineating its boundaries
on the zoning map, dismissed the charge of "spot zoning" by finding that the
amendment under attack was enacted to promote a comprehensive plan.
Primarily, the finding reflected the court's attitude that the Village of Tarry-
town lacked an adequate number of apartment units.26 The important dis-
tinction, however, made by the court in the Rodgers decision is that the zon-
ing ordinance and the master plan are not synonymous. Considering the
purpose of the requirement of a master plan-to prevent the capricious exer-
cise of legislative power which might result in haphazard or piecemeal zon-
ing2 7-the distinction made in Rodgers appears to be a necessary one.
On the other hand, it can safely be said that there is no reason to infer leg-
islative intent that the comprehensive plan be portrayed in some physical
form outside the ordinance itself.28 Neither should it be required, although
it is desirable, that the entire municipality or county be zoned at one time,
that regulations be uniform throughout the political subdivision,29 nor that
the plan itself relate to the area outside the locality.30 The master plan, there-
fore, must be something more than the zoning ordinance itself, yet it need
not be a tangible, all-inclusive, infallible prediction of the physical develop-
ment of the locality. Somewhere between these extremes lies the required
ingredients of a comprehensive plan.
In determining the existence of a master plan a prime concern of the re-
viewing court is whether the ordinance safeguards the public interest. In
the Maryland case of Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals31 the court agreed to
Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 619, 53 A.2d 659, 662 (1947).
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 123, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1951).
2 'Id. at 122, 96 N.E.2d at 733.
Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 165-66, 131 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1957).
21Id. at 166, 131 A.2d at 7.
2 County Commissioners of Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 339, 46 A.2d 684,
688 (1946).
1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 9-4 (3d ed. 1962).
1 Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 58-59, 133 A.2d 83, 89 (1957).
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affirm the decision allowing a floating industrial zone to descend in a sparsely-
populated, suburban residential area. The petitioning manufacturer in Huff
was supplying the federal government with precision instruments necessary
to the national defense and was subject to the request that such vital indus-
try be located out of the metropolitan area for safety reasons. The zoning
amendment which created the new industrial zone contained within its pro-
visions detailed requirements to be met by the petitioner which conditioned
the zone change, particularly in respect to building density, parking, and
landscaping. In holding that the amendment provisions were part of a gen-
eral plan the Maryland court explained that:
A comprehensive plan has been said to be a general plan to control and direct
the use of land and buildings by dividing the governmental area into use dis-
tricts according to present and planned future conditions, so as to accomplish,
as far as possible, the most appropriate uses of land consistent with the public
interest and the safeguarding of the individual property owner.3 2
It has been this judicial concern for the public good that has led courts
to arrive at opposite conclusions as to whether zone changes adhered to a
comprehensive plan. In Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore
County3 the court had to weigh the rights of individual property owners
whose property could well be adversely affected by the proposed change
against the public welfare of the community. The same conflicting interests
were evaluated in Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 4 a Pennsylvania case
invalidating a floating industrial zone. In both cases concern centered on
the neighboring owner's right to rely upon a zoning ordinance as reflecting
the current planned use of the community's land.
A plan may be comprehensive even though it provides a method whereby
relatively small pieces of land may be changed from the original classifica-
tion to another "if such contemplated changes and the procedure by which
they will be accomplished are carefully thought out and in harmony with
the uses contemplated or provided in the entire municipality."3 5 Whenever
the floating zone descends in a district devoted to other uses, singling out a
small parcel of land for a use classification totally different from that of the
surrounding area, the charge of spot zoning is certain to be raised. The de-
cision in Rodgers described spot zoning as the very antithesis of planned zon-
ing. If an ordinance is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan,
it is not illegal "spot zoning" even though it (1) singles out and affects but
82 Id. at 58-59, 133 A.2d at 89.
Offutt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 204 Md. 551, 561, 105 A.2d 219, 224 (1954).
"' Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Lower Gwynedd Twp., 401 Pa. 211, 218, 164 A.2d 7, 11
(1960).
8 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 30.
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one small plot or (2) creates in the center of a large zone small areas or dis-
tricts devoted to a different use.3 6 Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether
the particular zoning under attack consists of areas fixed within larger areas
of different use but whether it was accomplished for the benefit of individual
owners rather than pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the general wel-
fare of the community.3 7 Spot zoning may be illegal or legal. If it is an arbi-
trary and unreasonable devotion of the small area to a use inconsistent with
the uses to which the rest of the district is restricted and made for the sole
benefit of the private interests of the owner, it is illegal.3 8 On the other hand,
if the zoning of the small parcel is in accordance and in harmony with the
comprehensive zoning plan and is done for the public good-to serve one
or more of the purposes of the enabling statute, and bears a substantial re-
lationship to the public health, safety, moral, and general welfare-it is legal.8 9
A zoning plan does not cease to be a comprehensive plan because it looks
to reasonably foreseeable potential use of land which cannot be precisely
determined when the zoning is passed. In zoning of undeveloped areas ac-
count can be taken of potential uses reasonably foreseeable. Such was the case
in Huff where the planning commission looked upon the undeveloped areas
as a reservoir of future land uses. In Huff the new regulations proposed for
Baltimore County provided for twelve land use classifications varying from
low density residential districts to heavy manufacturing districts, including
the floating restricted manufacturing zone. The new floating zone was located
on the zoning map in a low density residential area and the court upheld the
procedure after paying particular attention to the recommendations of the
planning commission which were presented to the legislative body prior to
the adoption of the zone-change amendment. The planner's report stated
that the low density residential area was
... not visualized as a purely residential zone,-one which is thought of as con-
templating complete eventual development into approximately one-acre lots,
as the Zone permits. Because of the extent and character of Baltimore County
this R.40 (residential) Zone necessarily represents to a certain extent a 'reser-
voir' of future land uses, much of it certainly remaining indefinitely agricul-
tural, some becoming increasingly and more concentratedly residential in char-
acter, some being used for non-residential purposes .... 40
8Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra note 25, at 123-24, 96 N.E.2d at 735.
'7Ibid.
m Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra note 31, at 53, 133 A.2d at 88; Cassel v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 355, 73 A.2d 486, 493 (1950).
81 Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra note 31, at 57, 133 A.2d at 88; Offutt v. Board
of Zoning Appeals, supra note 33; Ellicott v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176,
23 A.2d 649 (1942).
,0 Report of Planning Commission to Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners,
quoted in Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra note 31, at 53-54, 133 A.2d at 86.
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Maryland, therefore, upheld as comprehensive a general plan which would
control and direct the use and development of property by dividing it into
districts according to present and potential use of the properties.
What can the municipalities do to side step the charge of "spot zoning"
when allowing changes in the plan? In Rodgers the court allowed the reclass-
ification of low density land to apartment house use thereby permitting gar-
den apartments for young families unable to find accommodations who might
otherwise move elsewhere. Here the court allowed a change in parcels of ten
acres or more for multiple occupancy even though the boundaries were not
set out in the ordinance. The Board of Trustees, the village's legisla-
tive body, had passed an ordinance amending Tarrytown's General Zoning
Ordinance. The ordinance created a new district, Res B-B, allowing for 15
or fewer families, without delineating the boundaries of the new district.
The boundaries were to be fixed by amendment to the official zoning map
at such time in the future as such districts were in demand. The ordinance
provided exacting standards of size and physical layout for the new zone. A
local administrative agency, the planning board, was empowered to approve
such rezoning amendments. In answering the attack by a neighbor upon the
ordinance, the New York court based its decision on the cardinal principle
that what is best for the body politic in the long run must prevail over in-
dividual interests. Thus, while the rezoning amendment did benefit an in-
dividual owner, while it did single out and affect one small plot, and while
it did create in the center of a large zone a small area devoted to another use,
nevertheless, the ordinance was upheld as pursuant to a comprehensive plan
for the general welfare of the entire community. The evidence presented,
showing the growing number of young families, the potential lightening of
the tax load, the development of scantly used land, and the attraction of
business was cited in the opinion in support of the community need and
therefore in support of the finding of the furtherance of a comprehensive
plan.
In Rodgers the New York court further found that the legislative body
did not divest itself or the administrative body of the power to regulate fu-
ture zoning for apartments. While it is true that the individual owner of 10
acres or more of land need only submit plans and a petition for locating
the floating apartment house zone on his property, nevertheless, he was not
ipso facto entitled to the zone change. The ordinance in Rodgers gave both
bodies the right to approve or disapprove the petition depending upon
whether it furthered a comprehensive plan or not. An arbitrary or capricious
determination by either body, of course, would be subject to reversal by the
courts.
4 1
"Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra note 25.
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However, when this same procedure for locating a floating zone came be-
for the Pennsylvania court in Eves it was held to devolve upon the town-
ship supervisors, duties quite beyond those outlined in the enabling legisla-
tion.42 The Pennsylvania court reasoned that the adoption of a procedure
whereby it is decided which areas of land will eventually be rezoned on a
case by case basis patently admits that at the point of enactment of the con-
troversial ordinance there was no orderly plan of particular land use for the
community.48 Final determination under such a scheme would expressly
await solicitation by individual land owners, thus making the planned use
of the community dependent upon its development. That is, the develop-
ment itself would become the plan, which is manifestly the antithesis of zon-
ing in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Again, in Huff, the argument was presented that even if a floating zone
could be valid in terms of conformity to a comprehension plan, "the de-
termination as to what small areas shall be so zoned in the future cannot be
left to an administrative body." 44 The Maryland court found that there was
no improper delegation of power to an administrative body. The reasoning
by which the court made this finding was by analogy to prior case law where-
in the authority delegated to an administrative body to grant special excep-
tions was upheld as valid. Factually, the court was convinced that the pro-
visions of the regulations, strictly followed, first, would protect vicinal prop-
erty owners and, second, would allow an area to be rezoned to accommodate
the floating use only when in actual operation and effect it would be a har-
monious part of the comprehensive plan. Finally, the court in Huff pointed
to the prior determination by the legislative body-insofar as that body
adopted the ordinance creating but not locating the floating zone-that the
use which the administrative body permits is prima facie proper in the en-
vironment in which it is permitted. Therefore, by analogy to the rules ap-
plicable to special exceptions rather than the general rules of original error
or change in conditions or the character of the neighborhood, and because
the ordinance established sufficient standards to protect both the public good
and the interests of nearby property owners, the court held that the claim of
improper delegation of legislative power was effectively refuted.
The floating zone is similar to the special exception. It would seem that
if the utilization of the device of special exceptions can comport with the
statutory requirement of a comprehensive plan, then the floating zone de-
vice can also be compatible with the statutory requirement.45 The principle
"While the duties outlined in the New York and Pennsylvania enabling acts are not
identical, they are substantially the same.
Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Lower Gwynedd Twp., supra note 34.
Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra note 31, at 60, 133 A.2d at 90.
'Craig, supra note 11.
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argument in favor of the special exception-that there has been a prior
legislative determination-is similarly applicable to the floating zone.
Whether a legislative body locates the floating zone or the special use appears
to make little significant difference so long as that body's actions are review-
able by the courts.
The decisions in Maryland, New Jersey and New York upholding the
floating zone concept introduce a degree of necessary flexibility into zoning
ordinances. While the Pennsylvania court reached an opposite conclusion
and invalidated a floating zone ordinance it did so to prevent ad hoc land
use control under very broad ideas of community welfare. 46 While the desir-
ability and need for flexibility can be fully appreciated, "too flexible and
loosely knit zoning provisions" 47 will continue to fail the judicial test. Not-
withstanding a growing concern that the rigidity of conventional zoning
doctrines be considerably relaxed so that the way can be opened for perfor-
mance zoning and planned development of large tracts or areas, 48 still, rath-
er detailed standards and provisions for notice to property owners will be
necessary ingredients of the valid floating zone ordinance.
In view of its decision in Donahue v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of
Whitemarsh Township,4 9 Pennsylvania appears to have retreated somewhat
from the literal interpretation given the enabling statute in its previous de-
cision in Eves. Nevertheless, it seems unwise to accept unqualifiedly the
Pennsylvania view which seems to parallel floating zones with illegal spot
zoning. A floating zone ordinance carefully drafted could easily be consist-
ent with a comprehensive plan of the community, even in Pennsylvania.
The recent opinion in Beall v. Montgomery County Council,50 a Mary-
land decision, distinguishes the rules applicable to the granting of variances
from those to be applied to the locating of a floating zone. The validity of
the floating zone in BeaU was determined by analogy to the validity of spe-
cial exceptions. In the opinion the court made it clear that the change in
neighborhood and mistake in original zoning factors, necessary determina-
tions in the granting of a variance, were not required to locate a floating
zone. When, as in the Beall case, a technical staff concludes that the granting
of the rezone application would comply with the zoning purposes contem-
plated by the legislative body, evidence of mistake in the original zoning
and of substantial change in character of the neighborhood is superfluous.
The Beall decision adds additional authority to the proposition that justifi-
Municipal Law Service Letter Vol. 10, No. 9, at 4 (Nov. 1960).
'7 Stickel, supra note 9.
,8 Municipal Law Service Letter, supra note 46.
"Donahue v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Whitemarsh Twp., 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
50 Beall v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965).
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cation for the locating of a floating zone is more appropriate by analogy
to the special exception.
The argument that all boundaries be delineated on the zoning map at the
time of enactment of the zoning ordinance gains merit only through a most
literal interpretation of the enabling legislation.51 It is true that the delinea-
tion of all land classifications would permit the maximum amount of notice
to property owners in the locality, yet generalized land use goals must seek
to advance the interests of the community rather than the individual.
5 2
Nevertheless, notice is an essential right and must not be ignored by a float-
ing zone ordinance. If carefully drafted, the ordinance can offer as much
individual protection as that provided by either the special exception or the
potential classification devices for altering land uses. These safeguards, con-
sidered with the fact that no individual has a vested right in the zoning class-
ification of his property, much less his neighbor's property, would seem to
negate any assertion that undelineated zones can not be a characteristic of a
valid zoning ordinance.
Courts will continue to require something other than bare zoning provi-
sions in determining the existence of a comprehensive plan. Yet, so long as
qualified full-time city planners with adequately-staffed planning bodies re-
main the exception rather than the rule, it seems unlikely that the courts
will require much more than due consideration for neighboring property
owners and the general welfare of the community. If the zoning ordinance
creates a floating zone and within its text contains standards and safeguards
to protect individual interests and indicates sufficient concern for the gener-
al good, the ordinance should be held to be within the broad principles
of the comprehensive plan required by enabling acts.
11 For the argument that there should be a specified number of ascertained districts each
with a definite slope, area and location, see Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115,
126, 96 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1951) (Conway, J., dissenting).
6 Craig, supra note 11.
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